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Abstract
In this paper, we analyse the human capital accumulation process over the
life cycle of individuals under the hypothesis of earnings uncertainty. To do
so, we develop a continuous time dynamic programming model which takes
into account several sources of uncertainty, concerning the human capital ac-
cumulation process and the labour market. In particular, the risks over future
wage rates and over-education are explicitly taken into account. The model
permits an in-depth study of each source’s eﬀect of uncertainty on human
capital investment. We demonstrate that investment in education may be
encouraged, depending on the individual’s perception of the diﬀerent risks.
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1 Introduction
Since the pioneering studies of Schultz (1961) and Becker (1962) in the area of
education, schooling and training have been considered as investments in human
capital in the same way as physical capital. But for many years, the risky nature of
this investment was overlooked in the analysis. Over the past two decades, however,
European labour markets have seen the rise of an often chronic and sometimes long-
term form of youth unemployment, accompanied by wage downgrading at the time
of first hiring. The vulnerability of the young people and the uncertainty they
face at the beginning of their working life are expressed not only by the increased
diﬃculties in finding a job which corresponds to their level of schooling but also by
employment rates which are much more sensitive to the economic situation than
those found among other categories of the labour force. In the area of education,
we also observe a diversification of training streams and pathways. At aggregate
level, this increased heterogeneity may accentuate the uncertainty about the quality
of the pathways. At individual level, it tends to blur employers’ perceptions of the
students’ productivity potentials.
As a result, the predictions of models based on the hypothesis of perfect foresight
about the future value of the human capital accumulated seem less and less adapted
to the European observed data. It thus seems necessary to resituate the problem
of human capital investment, as well as that of the eﬃciency of the educational
systems stemming from it, in a more general framework which takes uncertainty
into account. The question which then arises is to what extent and in what forms
uncertainty influences decisions to invest in human capital.
The first rigorous theoretical analysis of this question was proposed by Levhari
and Weiss (1974) in a two-period model. The uncertainty about future wages, or
in other words, the return to the human capital investment, is assumed to come
from two sources. The first has to do with the learning process in the educational
system and covers a group of exogenous individual and collective features such as,
for example, the students’ scholastic aptitude, but also the quality of the courses,
the schools, the teachers, the scholar paths and so on. The second arises from
the labour market and covers the future conditions of labour supply and demand.
These two type of souces of uncertainty, which are intuitive and fairly realistic,
are not present in the model specifications. Indeed, the sources of uncertainty
are not separated out; rather, they are aggregated and represented by a single
random variable. Uncertainty is defined by the variance of earnings, in the sense of
Rothschild-Stiglitz (1970). The eﬀect of uncertainty is studied on the basis of the
correlation between the average and future marginal returns to human capital. If
this correlation is positive, or if the variance of the gains increases with the level
of schooling (which amounts to the same thing), the anticipated return to human
capital will be greater than that to a financial asset presumed to be certain. In this
case, risk averse individuals will protect themselves by reducing their human capital
investment. A negative correlation between average and marginal returns has the
opposite eﬀect: an increase in the level of schooling will reduce the variance of the
future gains. In this case, investment in human capital is encouraged when risk
increases. The hypothesis generally employed in the empirical literature, however,
is that of an increasing risk1 (increasing variance of earnings), which leads to the
assumption of a lower education level in a situation of uncertainty.
More recently, Kodde (1986) has provided empirical results which, contradicting
Levhari and Weiss’s prediction, indicate on the contrary the existence of a positive
relationship between uncertainty and investment in human capital. In an attempt
1See Low and Ormiston (1991) for empirical evidence on the NLS data.
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to take this empirical observation into account, Snow and Warren (1990) developed
an extension of the Levhari and Weiss model by including the hypothesis of an
endogenous labour supply. This permits the introduction of an income eﬀect which
may make the relationship between risk and investment ambiguous. In other words,
the investment may increase or decrease with risk.
In our view, this ambiguity of the eﬀect of risk on investment stems from the ag-
gregation of the diﬀerent sources of uncertainty through a single random parameter
capturing all the eﬀects. It might be thought a priori that these diﬀerent sources of
uncertainty have an unequal, if not contradictory, eﬀect on the investment in hu-
man capital. In the models already cited, moreover, the fact that the individual’s
planning horizon is reduced to two periods does not allow the intertemporal nature
of the human capital investment to be brought out.
In order to get beyond these two limitations, we propose a dynamic programming
model in continuous time which allows us not only to study the individual’s behav-
iour over the whole of his or her life cycle but also to break down and separately
identify the eﬀects of the diﬀerent sources of uncertainty.
In the next section, we present the general principles of the problem of human
capital investment in a stochastic context. Section 3 is then devoted to the specifi-
cation of our model. In section 4, we present the results of the model in the general
case where individual preferences are not specified. In section 5, after identifying
the individual preferences, we discuss the eﬀect of the diﬀerent sources of uncer-
tainty on optimal investment in human capital. Our conclusions are presented in
section 6.
2 The continuous-time stochastic model of human
capital: preliminary elements
The study of the dynamic nature of human capital investment in a context of
uncertainty can, as in the case of certainty, take two directions. In the first (e.g.,
Fan [1993], Hogan and Walker [2002]), the theory of real options is applied to the
problem of education, with a model of schooling choice transposed to the uncertain
case. In the second (Williams [1979]), the portfolio theory is applied to the problem
of investment choice over the individual’s entire life cycle.
The first group of studies develop a pure schooling model in which the individual
has to decide on the optimal, definitive date for stopping his or her studies. Here,
education is considered to be an irreversible investment2. The problem facing the
individuals is the following: as long as they remain in the educational system,
they have at each date the option to leave school and enter the labour market at
a wage rate which depends stochastically on the amount of time spent in school.
Once that option is exercised, they can no longer return to the educational system
and will, throughout their life cycle, receive an income which depends uniquely on
the accumulated schooling. In the presence of risk, individuals are encouraged to
postpone their exit from the school system because of the irreversibility of their
choice. Indeed, by remaining in school, they have the option of leaving during
the following period with the aim of taking advantage of a ‘better draw’ in the
distribution of returns. They also have the choice of remaining in school in order to
avoid a ‘bad draw’. For this reason, uncertainty increases the potential advantage
of the option. But if, in anticipation of a low wage, individuals do not exercise their
2The stochastic versions of the optimal stopping problem are analysed in Kamien and Schwartz
(1991). The application of these techniques to physical capital investment is reviewed in Dixit and
Pindick (1994).
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option, the loss of value of the option remains unchanged. This asymmetry of the
eﬀects of uncertainty on the value of the option incites individuals to postpone their
exit from the school system even longer when uncertainty about wages is great3.
Thus, the duration of schooling is an increasing function not only of the antici-
pated return but also of the risk associated with education. This model introduces
micro-economic elements in the analysis of the phenomenon of continued studies,
by emphasising the protective role of education in face of the risks existing at the
time of labour-market entry. Nonetheless, the findings of this kind of model must
be qualified in the light of the restrictive hypotheses on which it is based. First of
all, the Hogan and Walker (2002) model, for example, may be seen as a very specific
case of the human capital model, namely a pure schooling model in which labour
supply is presumed to be exogenous. This means that the duration of schooling is
the only variable which the individual controls. As a result, the model rules out any
possibility of training associated with employment. During the employment period,
wages are presumed to increase at an exogenous rate which is identical for all work-
ers. Thus, the average wage diﬀerentials observed over the individuals’ life cycles
are explained solely on the basis of schooling levels. Any possibility of changing the
initial situation through post-schooling investment in human capital is excluded.
So, the question of investment over the life cycle becomes irrelevant because the
individual’s future situation is definitively established at the time of the exit from
the school system.
Last of all, the model does not distinguish the sources of uncertainty. Since the
process of human capital accumulation is not specified, all uncertainty is presumed
to come from the labour market through wages. The risky content of school-based
learning is totally absent.
Here, we would point out that the diversification of training pathways increas-
ingly encountered in Western economies can also aﬀect uncertainty about the stu-
dents’ productive capacities. This observation suﬃces to justify taking into account
the risk which may exist within the education process. This second path of analy-
sis corresponds to the approach taken by Williams (1979) in a diﬀerent but more
general theoretical context. Williams proposes a portfolio model much closer to
the initial human capital model. In fact, he generalises the basic model, where the
individual makes a trade-oﬀ between non-risky activities, to the case of a trade-oﬀ
between risky activities. The object of the individual choice is not so much that
of the optimal duration of studies as that of the optimal intensity of investment
in human capital over the life cycle. This comes from the fact that, for Williams,
human capital cannot be reduced solely to initial training. Post-schooling training,
especially on-the-job training, is another form of human capital investment taken
into account. Williams’s frame of analysis appears also more general, to the extent
that, on the one hand, the labour supply is endogenous and, on the other, diﬀerent
sources of uncertainty, involving both the educational process and the wage, are
taken into account. More precisely, four sources of uncertainty are distinguished.
A first source bears on the value of the financial assets in which the individual can
invest on the financial market. Two others stem from the process of human capital
accumulation: one concerns the eﬃciency of school-based learning and the other,
the depreciation rate of the human capital. The last source of uncertainty has to
do with the wage rate by level of skills. The co-variances between the diﬀerent
risky variables play a central role in the analysis, notably in the determination of
the overall eﬀect of risk on the investment in human capital. Contrary to Hogan
and Walker (2002), Williams concludes that risk has a negative eﬀect: individuals
are led to reduce their human capital investment when the risk associated with
education increases.
3The proof of this is provided in the appendix of Hogan and Walker (2002).
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In the section which follows, we show that this result stems from the (ad hoc)
hypothesis of the independence of the diﬀerent markets. By forcing the nullity of
certain covariances, particularly those linking the risks relative to the knowledge-
acquisition processes to the risk over wages, Williams implicitly brings all the weight
of uncertainty to bear on the learning process. This hypothesis is diﬃcult to defend
to the extent that the very essence of the economics of education (Willis and Rosen
1979) lies in the study of the mechanisms articulating the schooling process and its
recognition on the labour market. The observable and non-observable individual
features explaining the diﬀerences in education levels also account in part for the
diﬀerences in wages (Willis 1986, Grilliches 1977).
On the basis of all of these criticisms, we propose a theoretical model which
develops that of Williams (1979) in two directions. On the one hand, in order to
avoid reducing all uncertainty stemming from the labour market to the risk over
wages, we explicitly integrate the risk bearing on the human capital utilisation in
future occupations. This allows a better appreciation of imperfect job matching on
the labour market and the present phenomenon of overeducation faced by young
people in the school-to-work transition. On the other hand, we raise the hypothesis
of independence between the random variables describing the process of acquiring
knowledge and those relating to the labour market and re-examine the eﬀect of
diﬀerent sources of uncertainty on human capital investment.
3 Specification of the model
In this section, we present a dynamic stochastic model of human capital accumula-
tion over the life cycle. The uncertainty here stems from five sources: the four used
in Williams’s (1979) model plus an additional one bearing on the utilization rate
of human capital in the future occupation. We suppose that a trade-oﬀ can exist
between the human capital held by the individual and the level of human capital
required by the future job. Uncertainty intervenes in the constraints of the accu-
mulation of human capital and financial wealth, which is why the first step in this
study consists of correctly deriving the stochastic versions of these accumulation
equations.
In this kind of model, the value of the current human capital stock k(t) is defined
as the income of the maximum work which the individual can expect on the labour
market. The proportion of time which he or she devotes to training during the
period t is measured by e(t), while l(t) designates the proportion of time allocated
to leisure activities during the period t. Thus, (1− e(t)− l(t)) is the proportion of
remaining time devoted to work.
The human capital stock for the period t + ∆t is equal to the stock of the
preceding period k(t) plus the new human capital produced at the beginning of the
period t+∆t : θ(t, t+∆t)e(t)k(t). This production of human capital is supposed to
depend linearly of the proportion of time devoted to education e(t) and a parameter
θ(t, t+∆t) which measure the eﬃciency of training. It is also necessary to subtract
the depreciation of the human capital stock during the period t, which is equal to
δ(t, t+∆t)k(t):
K (t+∆t) = K (t) + θ (t, t+∆t) e (t)K (t)− δ (t, t+∆t)K (t) (1)
To take into account the problems faced by young people on the European labour
markets, we suppose that, on the labour market, the individual can obtain a job
5
which doesn’t correspond completely to its level of skills. More precisely, we suppose
that the individual’s human capital can be not fully used in a given occupation.
Thus, by weighting the stock of human capital (equation 1) by a coeﬃcient h, with
h ∈ [0, 1[ one obtains the stock of human capital actually used in a given occupation:
h (t+∆t)K (t+∆t) = h (t+∆t) [1 + θ (t, t+∆t) e (t)− δ (t, t+∆t)]K (t) (2)
This equation highlights a phenomenon of overeducation, which is all the more
large as h is low 4.
By multiplying each of the two members of the equation above by the price of
the human capital ”ω”, one obtains the money value of the stock of human capital
actually used on the labour market :
ω (t+∆t)h (t+∆t)K (t+∆t) = ω (t+∆t)h (t+∆t) [1 + θ (t, t+∆t) e (t)− δ (t, t+∆t)]K (t)
(3)
Assuming that k (t+∆t) = ω (t+∆t)h (t+∆t)K (t+∆t) , the value of the
stock of future human capital actually used in the future occupation can be rewritten
in the following form:
k (t+∆t) = h (t+∆t)
h(t)
ω (t+∆t)
ω (t)
[1− δ (t, t+∆t) + θ (t, t+∆t) e (t)] k (t) (4)
Written in this form, this equation indicates that the value of the stock of human
capital of the period t + ∆t, depends not only on the variation of the volume of
human capital, expressed by the term within the square brackets, but it depends
also on the variations between the dates t and t +∆t, of the value of the stock of
human capital on the labour market, expressed at the same time by the variation of
the utilization rate of the human capital in future job h(t+∆t)h(t) , and by the variation
of its market price : ω(t+∆t)ω(t) .
The uncertainty bears on the parameters θ (t, t+∆t) and δ (t, t+∆t) , relating
to the process of accumulation of human capital in volume, as well as on the para-
meters ω (t+∆t) et h (t+∆t) , relating to the future value of the human capital
on the labour market.
The stochastic parameter θ (t, t+∆t) represents the uncertainty about the indi-
vidual’s real learning ability. It also takes into account all the non-identifiable inputs
entering the education process. The random parameter δ (t, t+∆t) represents the
unknown rate of human capital depreciation in each period.
The random parameter ω (t+∆t) corresponds to the future wage rate by skill
level, unknown at the time t. We suppose that the individual perfectly observes
the current wage corresponding to his level of human capital, but doesn’t know
the distribution of future wages. The randomness of the distribution of wages
(for a fixed level of education) is a manner of characterizing future trends in the
labour market - in particular, the institutional conditions of wage determination
4By definition, the stock of human capital held by an individual corresponds to the maximum
labour income to which it can claim on the labour market. Thus, any phenomenon of underedu-
cation, corresponding to an overuse of the human capital in a particular employment, is excluded
from this model.
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- largely uncontrolled by the individual at the time he makes his decisions. In
other words, two individuals having the same characteristics, working in similar
jobs today, can perceive diﬀerent wages in the future, only because they will have
obtained a diﬀerent ”draw” in the distribution of wages.
The parameter h (t+∆t) represents the uncertainty bearing on the utilization
rate of human capital in the future occupation. We suppose that employment is
heterogeneous from the point of view of the use of human capital, and that the
individual does not perfectly know the distribution of jobs. That means, two indi-
viduals having the same level of human capital can obtain diﬀerent labour incomes
in the future, if they reach diﬀerent jobs or diﬀerent professional promotions. In
other words, even if the individual could perfectly know the wages associated with
each job, he cannot know his future labour income a priori, because he does not
know if the job which he will reach in the future is fully adapted to its skills. Thus,
the parameter h (t+∆t) highlights the possible problems of mismatch between the
skill requirements of jobs and the skills held by the individuals. In what follows, we
will use the term ”risk of overeducation” to refer to the risk bearing on h (t+∆t)5 .
These four random parameters are presumed to be infinitely divisible and to
follow lognormal laws of mean µ and variance σ : θ (t, t+∆t) ∼ LN(µθ,σθ);
δ (t, t+∆t) ∼ LN(µδ,σδ); ω (t+∆t) ∼ LN(µω,σω) et h (t+∆t) ∼ LN(µh,σh).
By introducing the temporal dimension, the variations of each of the random
parameters are presumed, according to Ito’s lemma6, to follow a Weiner process
characterised by the following stochastic diﬀerentials :
∆θ (t) = µθ∆t+ σθ∆Z (t) (5)
∆δ (t) = µδ∆t+ σδ∆Z (t) (6)
∆ω (t) = ω (t) [µω∆t+ σω∆Z (t)] (7)
∆h (t) = h (t) [µh∆t+ σh∆Z (t)] (8)
µθ, µδ, µω et µh represent the instantaneous means of the respective stochastic
processes. These parameters are constant, following the properties of the Wiener
process. σθ,σδ,σω et σh are vectors of constants of N + 4 dimension. They cor-
respond to the instantaneous standard deviations of each stochastic process. They
are indicators of risk in Rothschild-Stiglitz’ sense . Z(t) is the standard Wiener
process. By definition, it is a random vector of zero mean, zero covariances and
variance ∆t. In this model, it is also of dimension N + 4.
On the basis of these four expressions, by making∆t tend towards 0, by replacing
these values in (1) and applying Ito’s lemma, we obtain the stochastic expression
of the human capital accumulation equation in continuous time 7 :
5The definition of over-education we adopt here, in term of under-utilisation of human capital
on the labour market, is quite restrictive. Now, a large literature covers this issue both in Europe
and North America. For a complete treatment of measurement issues, theoretical and empiqiric
results and challenges raised by the question of over-education, see the excellent survey of Sloane
(2002).
6 Ito’s lemma, also known as the fundamental theorem of stochastic calculus, is the most com-
monly used result in continuous-time models. It permits the determination of the parameters of
any Ito process when the latter depends on a process of the same nature with known parameters.
The unidimensional and multidimensional versions of Ito’s lemma are given by Rogers (1991), pp.
234-236.
7The calculations used to obtain this equation are presented in their totality in appendix A.1.
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dk (t)
k (t)
= (µh + µω + (µθ + σhθ + σθω) e (t)− µδ − σhδ − σδω + σhω) dt
+(σh + σω + σθe (t)− σδ)0 dZ (t) (9)
This equation establishes that the return on human capital dk(t)k(t) follows a dif-
fusion process linearly dependent on the time devoted to education e (t). More
precisely, an increase in the current allocation to education e(t) simultaneously in-
creases the mean and the variance of the instantaneous human capital growth rate
and thus the future earnings over the life cycle.
On the basis of this equation, we may note that the extent of this educational
eﬀect crucially depends on the net productivity parameter θ. Only uncertainty
about the depreciation of human capital has no weight on the education eﬀect.
Unlike Williams (1979), uncertainty about the labour market directly aﬀects the
return to the human capital investment through the instantaneous covariances σhθ
and σθω. In Williams’s model indeed, jobs are supposed to be homogeneous : human
capital is always fully used, so that h = 1 and σhθ = 0. In addition, the adjustments
occurring on the labour market and in the educational system are presumed to be
independent, which implies the nullity of σθω and other covariances appearing in
equation (9).
The originality of our work is precisely to reject this assumption of indepen-
dence, and suppose, on the contrary, the existence of a nonnull relation between
the variables associated with the process of human capital accumulation and those
associated with the value of human capital on the labour market. σθh identifies the
relation between the eﬃciency of training and the utilization rate of human capital
in the future job. σθω identify the relation between the eﬃciency of training and the
level of the wages (for a fixed level of skills). We suppose that these instantaneous
covariances are positive : the most eﬀective individuals, or individuals who have
followed the most eﬀective formations, are those who reach higher levels of employ-
ment and wages corresponding to their level of human capital. This assumption,
rather intuitive, is not contradicted by empirical work. Besides, the aim of a vast
econometric literature around the famous ”ability bias” is to identify this type of
relations (cf Moullet (2000), for a synthesis of this work).
At the same time, individuals are assumed to divide their current financial wealth
among three elements: consumption expenditures, an investment in a non-risky as-
set and an investment in N risky assets on the financial market. The asset without
risk is assumed to yield a known interest rate fixed at r. The yields of the risky fi-
nancial assets are assumed to follow a Wiener process with the stochastic diﬀerential
written as :
dP (t) = P (t) [µdt+ Γ0dZ(t)] (10)
where µ is the vector of the average returns per unit of time and Σ ≡ Γ0Γ
the variances-covariances matrix of the returns of the N risky assets per unit of
time, of dimension (N + 4) × N . In addition, the returns of the N risky assets
show the covariances Σω ≡ Γ0σω with wage adjustments by level of education,
the covariances Σh ≡ Γ0σh with over-education adjustments for a given level of
skills and the covariances Σθ ≡ Γ0σθ and Σδ ≡ Γ0σδ with the parameters of net
productivity and depreciation of human capital. To make drastic simplifications in
the calculations, we shall assume these covariances to be equal to 0 in what follows.
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In other words, like Williams (1979), we assume that the financial market functions
in an independent way, namely that the adjustments of wages and over-education,
as well as the values of net productivity and depreciation of productive skills, are
determined independently of the forces exerted by the financial market.
IfX is the proportion of the wealth invested in risky assets, c(t) the consumption
flow at time t, and y(t) the flow of labour income received in t, the variation of the
financial wealth between t and∆t, when ∆t tends towards 0, may be written :
dw (t) =
wX 0dP (t)
P (t)
+ r (1−X)w (t) dt+ y (t) dt− c (t) dt
By replacing dP (t) by its value given by (7) and rearranging the terms, we
obtain the stochastic constraint of financial wealth accumulation:
dw (t) =
£
(rw(t) + y (t)− c (t)) + w (t) (µ− r1)0X
¤
dt+ w (t)X 0Γ0dZ (t) (11)
Equations (6) and (8) constitute the constraints under which individuals are,
over the whole of their life cycle, presumed to maximise their time-separable utility
function, which depends on consumption, leisure, human capital8 and terminal
wealth9. More precisely, the programme to be resolved is posed in the following
way :
Max Et
Z T
t
u [c (t) , l (t) , k (t) , t]∆t+B [w (T ) , T ] (12)
under the constraints10:
dk
k
= (µh + µω + (µθ + σhθ + σθω) e− µδ − σhδ − σδω + σhω) dt
+(σh + σω + σθe− σδ)0 dZ (t) (13)
dw =
£
rw + (1− e− l) k − c+ w (µ− r1)0X
¤
dt+ wX 0Γ0dZ (t) (14)
et c > 0, 0 6 e, l 6 1 (15)
4 Optimal investment in human capital
On the basis of this initial stochastic programme, Bellman’s optimality principle
allows us to express the following equivalences :
8 It is not essential to integrate human capital into the utility function but this allows us to take
into account the non-monetary earnings procured by human capital, in the same way that leisure
gives satisfaction to the individuals .
9When the individual’s planning horizon is not infinite, a bequest function B[w(T ), T ] may be
added to the problem.
10 In what follows, to simplify, we respectively replace c (t) , l (t) , k (t) , w (t) , and e (t) , by
c, l, k, w, e.
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V [k,w, t, T ] ≡ Max Et
Z T
t
u [c, l, k, t]∆t+B [w (T ) , T ] (16)
≡ Max Et {
Z T
t
u [c, l, k, t]∆t
+Max Et+∆t
Z T
t+∆t
u [c, l, k, t]∆t+B [w (T ) , T ]}
≡ Max Et {
Z t+∆t
t
u [c, l, k, t]∆t
+V [k,w, t+∆t, T ]} (17)
V [k,w, t, T ] is called the indirect utility function. It corresponds to the maxi-
mum utility level which individuals can expect to obtain over the whole of their life
cycle if they make an optimal allocation of their time and wealth to the diﬀerent
activities oﬀered to them. It is presumed to be strictly increasing and concave in k
and w.
Bellman’s optimality principle allows us to show the present and future eﬀects of
the variations of the control variables on the optimal trajectory of the state variables.
More specifically, the maximum utility obtained in the interval [t, T ] results from a
series of choices of control variables e, wX, c and l and the evolution of the state
variables k, and w. Consequently, the first term u[c, l, k, t]∆t gives the value of the
direct eﬀects of the decision made at instant t, while the second V [k,w, t +∆t, T ]
measures the indirect eﬀects, namely the cumulative utility which individuals can
obtain in the interval [t+∆t, T ] given the choice made in the interval [t, t+∆t].
In this model, human and financial capital are presumed to be imperfect substi-
tutes, which explains why k and w appear separately in the indirect utility function
V . This hypothesis stems from the fact that, unlike financial capital, human capi-
tal cannot be freely bought or sold on the market. It is non-commercial and partly
irreversible.
In appendix A.2, we show that programme (17) is equivalent to :
0 ≡ Max {u [c, l, k, t] + Vkk (µh + µω + (µθ + σhθ + σθω) e− µδ − σδh − σδω + σhω)
+Vw
£
rw + (1− e− l) k − c+ w (µ− r1)0X
¤
+
1
2
Vkkk
2
¡
σ2h + σ
2
ω + σ
2
θe
2 + σ2δ + 2σhθe+ 2σθωe− 2σθδe+ 2σhω − 2σhδ − 2σδω
¢
+
1
2
Vwww
2X 0ΣX + VkwkwΣ0ωX + Vt} (18)
This equation with stochastic partial derivatives is known as a Bellman stochas-
tic optimal control equation or a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Its internal
solutions are obtained in the classic way, by positing each of the partial derivatives
equal to zero11. We thus obtain the optimality conditions which implicitly define
the four solutions c∗ (t) , l∗ (t) , wX∗ (t) , and e∗ (t).
The first two conditions, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , are immediate :
11The subscripts designate the partial derivatives relative to the variables.
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uc
Vw
= 1 (19)
and
uc
ul
=
1
k
(20)
Conditions (19) and (20) are similar to those of models with certainty since the
risk-related parameters are not involved in the determination of these two opti-
mality conditions. Furthermore, current consumption and current leisure time are
aﬀected in a way which is similar to the certainty case by the increments in finan-
cial wealth and human capital. In eﬀect, a marginal increment in financial wealth
increases the individual’s current consumption and current leisure time12. If, like
Williams, we assume that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure is independent of human capital, an increase in current human capital
increases the individual’s current consumption but reduces current leisure13. In-
deed, the increment in human capital gives rise to a relative increase in the value of
current financial wealth and thus, through (19), increases consumption. However,
by increasing the marginal utility of financial wealth, the increment in human capi-
tal increases the opportunity cost of leisure and individuals are thus encouraged to
reduce their leisure time in favour of work.
The third condition implies that the partial derivative of (18) with respect to
wX is equal to 0, which yields :
Vw (µ− r1) + VwwwX 0Σ+ VkwkΣ0ω = 0
Thus
wX(t) =
µ
− Vw
Vww
¶
Σ−1 (µ− r1)− Vkw
Vww
kΣ−1Σ0ω (21)
Finally, the optimal level of human capital investment is given by :
Vkk (µθ + σhθ + σθω)− Vwk + Vkkk2σ2θe− Vkkk2σθδ + Vkkk2σhθ + Vkkk2σθω = 0
Which, if we rearrange the terms, yields :
e(t) =
µ
− Vk
Vkkk
¶
(µθ + σhθ + σθω)− VwVk
σ2θ
+
σθδ − σhθ − σθω
σ2θ
(22)
Condition (21) is similar to the optimality condition of a standard mean-variance
portfolio problem. In eﬀect, it establishes that the individual’s risky asset portfolio
is constituted at the optimum of the two base portfolios. In the general case, the
12 In fact, if w increases, then, according to (19), ∂uc∂w = Vww. Thus
∂c
∂w =
Vww
ucc
> 0, according
to the concavity hypothesis of utlity functions. By applying the same principle, we also shows that
leisure increases with financial wealth : ul = kuc = kVw. Thus
∂ul
∂w = kVww and
∂l
∂w = k
Vww
ull
> 0.
13The hypothesis ∂∂k
³
uc
ul
´
= 0 implies that ∂c∂k = −
uc
ul
ucc
ull
∂l
∂k . Utility is a strictly increasing
and concave function of c and l, thus : uc > 0, ul > 0, ucc < 0 and ull < 0. We deduce that ∂c/∂k
and ∂l/∂k are of opposite sign. However , from (19), ∂uc∂k = Vwk, thus
∂c
∂k =
Vwk
ucc
> 0. We can
conclude that ∂l∂k < 0.
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portfolio Σ−1Σ0ω is composed solely of risky assets and represents the maximum
coverage against risk over human capital. If we assume that wage adjustments have
no influence on the price of financial assets, this portfolio is then null, since in this
case Σ0ω is null. The other portfolio, Σ−1 (µ− r1), is the standard market portfolio.
We may note that the composition of the optimal risky asset portfolio is crucially
dependent on the individuals’ perception of the risk (Σ), but also on the behaviour
adopted in face of the risk. Investment in risky assets is thus proportional to the
risk premium (−12Σ
Vww
Vw
) and inversely proportional to the Arrow-Pratt measure of
absolute risk aversion14 : (−VwwVw ), as well as to the variance of the returns (Σ). It
should also be noted that the weight attached to the market portfolio is strictly the
inverse of the measure of absolute risk aversion.
Investment in education (22) is directly aﬀected by the parameters associated
with the risk inherent in human capital accumulation. In fact, individuals allocate
their time to training activities in function of their risk preferences and their judge-
ment about the course of future events. We can observe that investment in human
capital is highly dependent on the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion
−VkkkVk . In particular, any increase in risk aversion results in a reduction of invest-
ment in human capital.
The time allocated to education also depends on the perception of the risk asso-
ciated with education, as represented by the whole of the instantaneous variances
and covariances. It depends directly on the risk associated with learning eﬃciency,
measured by the variance of the marginal product of education σ2θ. On the other
hand, the risks bearing on the depreciation of existing skills, on wages and on over-
education, intervene directly through the intermediary of the covariances σθδ,σhθ
and σθω.
The main diﬀerence from the Williams (1979) model is that here, the overall
eﬀect of the diﬀerent sources of uncertainty on human capital investment cannot
be unambiguously determined, because it depends on the sign and scale of the
covariances. In fact, the absence of uncertainty about the distrbution of jobs (over-
education risk) and the hypothesis of independence between the risk over wages and
risks existing in the training process leadWilliams to make the following predictions:
the increase of risk over the marginal product of education results in a decrease in
human capital investment and earnings over the life cycle. Similarly, assuming a
negative relationship between learning eﬃciency and depreciation (σθδ < 0), indi-
viduals are encouraged to reduce their investment to protect themselves against an
increased risk of skills depreciation.
In our model, these findings remain partly valid but they are insuﬃcient to
characterise the overall eﬀect of risk because the risk of over-education in the future
job and the risk concerning wages intervene in the determination of e(t). In order
to measure the impact of a variation in these two types of risk, it is necessary to
specify individual preferences in greater detail, as becomes clear when we observe
that the signs of these two eﬀects depend fundamentally on the value of the risk
aversion parameter. But this index, constructed from the indirect utility function V ,
generally absorbs the eﬀect of all the parameters of the model over the time structure
of the optimal values. Without additional restrictions on individual preferences, it
is not possible to obtain explicit solutions for (18) or to evaluate the impact of the
variations in the model’s parameters over the life cycle. This is why we specify the
individual preferences in greater detail in the following section.
14For a detailed presentation of the diﬀerent measures of risk aversion, cf. Laﬀont (1991).
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5 Specification of individual preferences and ef-
fects of the diﬀerent sources of uncertainty
Let us assume that the instantaneous utility function has the following structure15 :
u [c (t) , l (t) , k (t) , t] = α (t) [c (t)− c (t)]γ [l (t) k (t)]λ (23)
with α (t) , c (t) , c (t) , l (t) , k (t) > 0, γ,λ > 0 and γ + λ < 1
c (t) represents the individual’s minimal indispensable consumption level.
l (t) k (t) designates eﬀective leisure (cf. Heckman (1976)).
α (t) is the discount factor, such that the rate of preference for the present
−
.α(t)
α(t) > 0
In this case, the bequest function B becomes :
B [w (T ) , T ] = α (T ) [w (T )−w (T )]γ+λ (24)
w (t)−w (t) constitutes the individual’s eﬀective financial wealth. It corresponds
to the diﬀerence between current wealth w(t) and the minimum level of wealth
w (t) needed to satisfy the minimum level of consumption c (t). More precisely,
w (t) corresponds to the actualised sum of minimum consumption and minimum
terminal wealth :
w (t) ≡
Z T
t
c (τ) e−r(τ−t)dτ +w (T ) e−r(T−t) (25)
On the basis of (23) and (24), it is possible to find approximated explicit solutions
for the initial problem (12) :16 :
c∗ (t) ' c+
"
α
β
λλγ1−γ
γ + λ
# 1
1−γ−λ
[ηk + w −w] (26)
l∗ (t) ' η
·
α
β
γγλ1−γ
γ + λ
¸ 1
1−γ−λ ·
1 +
w −w
ηk
¸
(27)
wX∗ (t) ' Σ
−1 (µ− r1)
1− γ − λ [ηk + w −w] (28)
e∗ (t) ' (µθ + σhθ + σθω)− 1/η
(1− γ − λ)σ2θ
·
1 +
w −w
ηk
¸
+
σθδ − σhθ − σθω
σ2θ
(29)
With regard to the optimal solutions (26), (27) and (28), we arrive at the results
previously set out, identical to those of Williams (1979). A marginal increase in
eﬀective financial wealth w (t)−w (t) increases current consumption, current leisure
time and current investment in risky assets. An increment in eﬀective human capital
15This structure is identicat to that of Williams (1979), itself similar to that of Heckman (1976)
in a framework without uncertainty.
16The complete resolution is provided in appendix A.3. This problem is subject to constraints
(13), (14) and (15), as well as to the following ones.: β (T ) = α (T ) and η (T ) = 0. Solutions are
computed at time t.
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η (t) k (t)17 increases current consumption and current investment in risky assets but
reduces the time devoted to leisure. These results are demonstrated in appendix
A.4.
As was previously the case, current investment in risky assets is always reduced
when the risk aversion parameter (1− γ − λ) and the variance of the returns of the
risky assets (Σ) increase.
As in the certainty case, an increment in eﬀective human capital reduces the
optimal level of human capital investment. On the other hand, any increase in
current eﬀective wealth increases the human capital investment and, through equa-
tion (9), also increases the mean and variance of earnings over the life cycle. This
fundamental property, brought out by Williams (1979) and found here once again,
sharply contrasts with the predictions of models without uncertainty. Indeed, in
Heckman’s model, the structure of which is similar to ours, human capital invest-
ment is not aﬀected by variations in financial wealth (cf. Heckman 1976, p. 523).
As a result, the observed diﬀerences in education levels between individuals with
diﬀerent financial resources are commonly attributed to diﬀerences in real interest
rates. The latter are interpreted as the indirect proof of an imperfection in the capi-
tal market. It is likely, as Becker (1993) already pointed out, that this heterogeneity
in individual interest rates exists and that it increases the financial constraint of
the least wealthy individuals. In our case, however, the heterogeneity of the op-
portunity cost of education does not stem from the heterogeneity of the interest
rate. Other things being equal, individuals with limited financial resources attain
levels of education, and thus of wages, which are lower than those of those with
greater financial resources because they are confronted with a higher opportunity
cost of human capital. This theoretical result, which is fairly realistic, is obtained
independently of any imperfection of the capital market.
As emphasised by Williams (1979), variations in eﬀective financial wealth or the
ratio of eﬀective financial wealth to eﬀective human capital have an eﬀect not only
on the current values of optimal solutions but also on the time structure of these
variables. As indicated in appendix A.4, any increase in eﬀective wealth increases
consumption and leisure in the current period, but also in future periods if the rate
of time preference is suﬃciently low. On the other hand, variations in eﬀective
financial wealth and eﬀective human capital have an eﬀect on investment in risky
assets only in the current period. The proportion of income invested in risky assets
is independent of the individual’s time horizon. Finally, the increase of the finance
capital / human capital ratio increases current human capital investment. This
eﬀect is partially compensated over the individual’s life cycle because the marginal
rate of substitution between human capital and financial wealth decreases over time.
When individual preferences are specified, the eﬀect of certain risk parameters
on human capital investment is identical to the case where the utility function
is defined implicitly. In particular, increments in the relative risk aversion index
(1 − γ − λ), and in the risk over the depreciation of human capital (σδθ) reduce
current investment in education.
On the other hand, if we assume that individuals with a high marginal product
of education have easier access to jobs and wages better corresponding to their
education level, in other words, if σhθ > 0 and σωθ > 0, then an increase in the risk
over the labour market leads to an increase in human capital investment. Indeed,
any increase in the risk over future over-education, reflected in a positive increment
in σhθ, raises the level of human capital investment. Thus,
17Eﬀective human capital corresponds to the current stock of human capital weighted by the
marginal rate of substitution between human capital and financial capital (η).
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∂e(t)
∂σhθ
=
1
(1− γ − λ)σ2θ
·
1 +
w −w
ηk
¸
− 1
σ2θ
=
1
(1− γ − λ)σ2θ
·
w −w
ηk
+ γ + λ
¸
> 0
In the same way, this model predict that individuals will increase their human
capital investment in response to an increased risk on wages (the eﬀect is identical
to the preceding one).
Finally, contrary to Williams (1979) an increase of the risk bearing on the ef-
ficiency of education : σ2θ don’t necessarily reduce investment in human capital..
Two contradictory eﬀects are produced : a negative direct eﬀect through σ2θ, which
is located at the denominator of (29), and a positive indirect eﬀect through σhθ and
σωθ.
The economic interpretation of these results is relatively intuitive : The increase
in the risks bearing on the process of human capital accumulation (eﬃciency of
training and depreciation of existing skills) increases the possibilitiy that investment
in human capital doesn’t become profitable, and so, increases the opportunity cost
of investment. Conversely, the increase in the risks bearing on the labour market
reduces the opportunity cost of the investment, and is thus an incentive for the
individual to increase his investment in human capital.
These novel results are in sharp contrast with the clear-cut conclusions of Williams
(1979) concerning the eﬀect of risk on human capital investment. The extension
which we propose here permits a better understanding of why the uncertainty eﬀect,
when it is taken into account in an aggregate form, is diﬃcult to establish without
ambiguity, namely because the diﬀerent sources of uncertainty have contradictory
eﬀects on investment. The uncertainty about the process of human capital accumu-
lation exercises a negative direct eﬀect on the human capital investment while the
risk over the labour market indirectly encourages that investment. The perception
individuals have of these diﬀerent risks, expressed by the extent of the diﬀerent
covariances, is fundamental in the decision to invest in human capital. When in-
dividuals decide to invest in education, if they accord greater weight to the risk
of future over-education or the risk over their future wage rate than to the risks
associated with their learning process, they will, in order to protect themselves,
increase their demand for education. Our model thus oﬀers a theoretical response
to the phenomenon of continued studies and more generally to the increase in the
demand for education which has been observed in Western economies over the past
few decades.
6 Conclusion
This study has as its starting point a critique of the standard human capital model,
which is no longer capable of describing a certain number of realities observed in
the majority of developed countries. The existence (to varying degrees depending
on the country and the immediate economic situation) of the phenomena of over-
education and unemployment, which have been particularly marked among young
people for several years, no longer allows decisions in the area of educational policy
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to be based on a model assuming that individuals have a perfect knowledge of their
future situation when they make their decisions about education.
In order to go beyond this critique, we have presented a theoretical model which
situates the analysis of the demand for education in a context of uncertainty. The
hypothesis defended in this study is that the eﬀect of uncertainty cannot be de-
termined ex ante without ambiguity if the diﬀerent sources of uncertainty, bearing
at once on the learning process and the future labour-market situation, are not
identified in detail. For this reason, we have proposed an extension of the Williams
(1979) model in which five sources of uncertainty are specified.
To reflect the problems observed on the European labour markets, we have
integrated the risk of future over-education . In addition, by raising the hypothesis of
independence between variables related to the labour market and those defining the
process of human capital accumulation, we have been able to show the fundamental
role of individuals’ perceptions of the future conditions of wage and employment
on the labour market. We have shown that the weight accorded to the diﬀerent
sources of uncertainty is determinant in the decision to invest in human capital,
because the uncertainty stemming from the labour market and that stemming from
the learning process exercise contradictory eﬀects on investment. In particular,
education plays a protective role against the risks existing on the labour market
and may be encouraged if the risks associated with the learning process are low,
or at least if they are perceived as such. This conclusion at the individual level,
is also true from a social welfare point of view : education has to be promoted by
public autorities. As Anderberg and Anderson (2003) have recently shown, human
capital investment has an insurance eﬀect that reduce the complex macroeconomic
problem of optimal taxation.
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A Appendix : Resolution of the stochastic optimal
control problem using continuous time dynamic
programming techniques
A.1 Proof of the stochastic equation (9) of human capital
accumulation:
The second order Taylor expansion of equation (4) has the following form :
k(t+∆t) = k (t) + ∂k(t+∆t)
∂t
∆t+ ∂k(t+∆t)
∂h(t+∆t)∆h+
∂k(t+∆t)
∂ω(t+∆t)∆ω +
∂k(t+∆t)
∂θ(t, t+∆t)∆θ
+
∂k(t+∆t)
∂δ(t, t+∆t)∆δ +
1
2
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂h2(t+∆t) (∆h)
2
+
1
2
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂ω2(t+∆t) (∆ω)
2
+
1
2
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂θ2(t, t+∆t)
(∆θ)2 + 1
2
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂δ2(t, t+∆t)
(∆δ)2 + ∂
2k(t+∆t)
∂h(t+∆t)∂ω(t+∆t) (∆h∆ω)
+
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂h(t+∆t)∂θ(t, t+∆t) (∆h∆θ) +
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂h(t+∆t)∂δ(t, t+∆t) (∆h∆δ)
+
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂ω(t+∆t)∂θ(t, t+∆t) (∆ω∆θ) +
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂ω(t+∆t)∂δ(t, t+∆t) (∆ω∆δ)
+
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂θ(t, t+∆t)∂δ(t, t+∆t) (∆θ∆δ) +
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂t2
(∆t)2 + ∂
2k(t+∆t)
∂t∂h(t+∆t) (∆t∆h)
+
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂t∂ω(t+∆t) (∆t∆ω) +
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂t∂θ(t, t+∆t) (∆t∆θ) +
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂t∂δ(t, t+∆t) (∆t∆δ) +R (∆t)
By noting that terms in ∆t of order 2 and beyond are infinitely ”small” com-
pared with those in ∆t, they will be systematically neglected in calculations. The
last six terms thus disappear from the above development. While also noting that
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂h2 =
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂ω2 =
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂θ2 =
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂δ2 = 0, the Taylor series can be rewrit-
ten in the following way :
k(t+∆t) = k (t) + ∂k(t+∆t)
∂t
∆t+ ∂k(t+∆t)
∂h (t+∆t)∆h+
∂k(t+∆t)
∂ω (t+∆t)∆ω
+
∂k(t+∆t)
∂θ(t, t+∆t)∆θ +
∂k(t+∆t)
∂δ(t, t+∆t)∆δ +
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂h(t+∆t)∂ω(t+∆t) (∆h∆ω)
+
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂h(t+∆t)∂θ(t, t+∆t) (∆h∆θ) +
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂h(t+∆t)∂δ(t, t+∆t) (∆h∆δ)
+
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂ω(t+∆t)∂θ(t, t+∆t) (∆ω∆θ) +
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂ω(t+∆t)∂δ(t, t+∆t) (∆ω∆δ)
+
∂2k(t+∆t)
∂θ(t, t+∆t)∂δ(t, t+∆t) (∆θ∆δ)
The increases in the stochastic processes studied are supposed to be stationary,
which implies that ∂k(t+∆t)∂t ∆t = 0. The calculation of partial derivatives and the
substitution of ∆h,∆ω,∆θ and ∆δ by their respective value (5), (6), (7), (8) give :
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k(t+∆t)− k (t) = 1
h (t)
ω (t+∆t)
ω (t)
[1− δ(t, t+∆t) + θ(t, t+∆t)e (t)] k (t)h (t) (µh∆t+ σ0h∆Z (t))
+
h (t+∆t)
h (t)
1
ω (t)
[1− δ(t, t+∆t) + θ(t, t+∆t)e (t)] k (t)ω (t) (µω∆t+ σ0ω∆Z (t))
+
h (t+∆t)
h (t)
ω(t+∆t)
ω (t)
e (t) k (t) (µθ∆t+ σ0θ∆Z (t))
−h (t+∆t)
h (t)
ω(t+∆t)
ω (t)
k (t) (µδ∆t+ σ0δ∆Z (t))
+
1
h (t)
1
ω (t)
[1− δ(t, t+∆t) + θ(t, t+∆t)e (t)] k (t)h (t)ω (t)
× (µh∆t+ σ0h∆Z (t)) (µω∆t+ σ0ω∆Z (t))
+
1
h (t)
ω(t+∆t)
ω (t)
e (t) [1− δ(t, t+∆t) + θ(t, t+∆t)e (t)] k (t)h (t)
× (µh∆t+ σ0h∆Z (t)) (µθ∆t+ σ0θ∆Z (t))
− 1
h (t)
ω(t+∆t)
ω (t)
k (t)h (t) (µh∆t+ σ0h∆Z (t)) (µδ∆t+ σ0δ∆Z (t))
+
h (t+∆t)
h (t)
1
ω (t)
e (t) k (t)ω (t) (µω∆t+ σ0ω∆Z (t)) (µθ∆t+ σ0θ∆Z (t))
−h (t+∆t)
h (t)
1
ω (t)
k (t)ω (t) (µω∆t+ σ0ω∆Z (t)) (µδ∆t+ σ0δ∆Z (t))
By simplifying by h (t), at the first, fifth, seventh and at the ninth line and by
ω (t), at the second, fifth, tenth and at the eleventh line; by putting k (t) in factor
and passing it from the left side of the equation; and by developing the last five
terms, one obtains :
∆k (t)
k (t)
=
ω (t+∆t)
ω (t)
[1− δ(t, t+∆t) + θ(t, t+∆t)e (t)] (µh∆t+ σ0h∆Z (t))
+
h (t+∆t)
h (t)
[1− δ(t, t+∆t) + θ(t, t+∆t)e (t)] (µω∆t+ σ0ω∆Z (t))
+
h (t+∆t)
h (t)
ω(t+∆t)
ω (t)
e (t) (µθ∆t+ σ0θ∆Z (t))
−h (t+∆t)
h (t)
ω(t+∆t)
ω (t)
(µδ∆t+ σ0δ∆Z (t))
+ [1− δ(t, t+∆t) + θ(t, t+∆t)e (t)]×h
µhµω (∆t)
2
+ µhσ
0
ω∆Z (t)∆t+ µωσ0h∆Z (t)∆t+ ρhωσ0hσω (∆Z (t))
2
i
+
ω(t+∆t)
ω (t)
e (t) [1− δ(t+∆t) + θ(t+∆t)e (t)]×h
µhµθ (∆t)
2
+ µhσ
0
θ∆Z (t)∆t+ µθσ0ω∆Z (t)∆t+ ρhθσ0hσθ (∆Z (t))
2
i
−ω(t+∆t)
ω (t)
h
µhµδ (∆t)
2 + µhσ
0
δ∆Z (t)∆t+ µδσ0h∆Z (t)∆t+ ρhδσ0hσδ (∆Z (t))
2
i
+
h (t+∆t)
h (t)
e(t)
h
µωµθ (∆t)
2
+ µωσ
0
θ∆Z (t)∆t+ µθσ0ω∆Z (t)∆t+ ρωθσ0ωσθ (∆Z (t))
2
i
−h (t+∆t)
h (t)
h
µωµδ (∆t)
2 + µωσ
0
δ∆Z (t)∆t+ µδσ0ω∆Z (t)∆t+ ρδωσ0δσω (∆Z (t))
2
i
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where ρ denote the instanteneous correlation between stochastic processes.
When ∆t tends to 0 : h(t+∆t)h(t) =
ω(t+∆t)
ω(t) = 1 and
[1− δ(t, t+∆t) + θ(t, t+∆t)e (t)] = 1 from equation (23), thus :
∆k (t)
k (t)
= (µhdt+ σ
0
hdZ (t)) + (µωdt+ σ
0
ωdZ (t))
+e (t) (µθdt+ σ
0
θdZ (t))− (µδdt+ σ0δdZ (t))
+
h
µhµω (dt)
2 + µhσ
0
ωdZ (t) dt+ µωσ
0
hdZ (t) dt+ ρhωσ
0
hσω (dZ (t))
2
i
+e (t)
h
µhµθ (dt)
2
+ µhσ
0
θdZ (t) dt+ µθσ
0
hdZ (t) dt+ ρhθσ
0
hσθ (dZ (t))
2
i
−
h
µhµδ (dt)
2
+ µhγ
0
δdZ (t) dt+ µδγ
0
hdZ (t) dt+ ρhδσ
0
hσδ (dZ (t))
2
i
+e(t)
h
µωµθ (dt)
2 + µωσ
0
θdZ (t) dt+ µθσ
0
ωdZ (t) dt+ ρωθσ
0
ωσθ (dZ (t))
2
i
−
h
µωµδ (dt)
2
+ µωσ
0
δdZ (t) dt+ µδσ
0
ωdZ (t) dt+ ρδωσ
0
δσω (dZ (t))
2
i
Finally, from properties of the standard Wiener process: (dt)2 = dZ (t) dt =
o (dt) and (dZ (t))2 = dt+o (dt) .When rearranging terms, we find the final expres-
sion of the stochastic equation of human capital accumulation (9) :
dk (t)
k (t)
= (µh + µω + (µθ + σhθ + σθω) e (t)− µδ − σhδ − σδω + σhω) dt
+(σh + σω + σθe (t)− σδ)0 dZ (t)
where
σhθ = ρhθσ
0
hσθ = Cov (h, θ)
σθω = ρωθσ
0
θσω = Cov (ω, θ)
σhδ = ρhδσ
0
hσδ = Cov (h, δ)
σδω = ρδωσ
0
δσω = Cov (δ,ω)
σhω = ρhωσ
0
hσω = Cov (h,ω)
A.2 Proof of equation (18)
The first term of (17) in the square brackets can be approximated by u [c, l, k, t]∆t.
Applying to V [k,w, t+∆t, T ] the second order Taylor expansion, and neglecting
terms of higher order 18, then we obtain :
V [k (t) , w (t) , T ] ≡Max Et {u [c, l, k, t]∆t+ V [k,w, T ]
+ Vt∆t+ Vk∆k + Vw∆w +
1
2
(∆k)0 Vkk∆k +
1
2
(∆w)0 Vww∆w + Vkw (∆k)0∆w}
18That is the sum of terms in (dt)α with α > 1.
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By simplifing by V [k,w, T ] in each member of the equation and applying Itô’s
lemma when ∆t tends to 0, we find :
0 ≡ Max Et {u [c, l, k, t] dt
+
·
Vt + µkVk + µwVw +
1
2
σ2kVkk +
1
2
σ2wVww + σkσwVkw
¸
dt
+[σkVk + σwVw] dZ(t)} (30)
If we define
dV =
·
Vt + µkVk + µwVw +
1
2
σ2kVkk +
1
2
σ2wVww + σkσwVkw
¸
dt
+[σkVk + σwVw] dZ(t)} (31)
and expand the conditional expectation operator, we obtain the following sto-
chastic partial derivative equation (SPDE) :
0 ≡Max {Et u [c, l, k, t] dt+Et dV } (32)
This equation can be simplified because Z is a standard Wiener process. Thus
Et [dZ(t)] = 0 and Et [σkVk + σwVw] dZ(t) = 0. We can then write :
EtdV =
·
Vt + µkVk + µwVw +
1
2
σ2kVkk +
1
2
σ2wVww + σkσwVkw
¸
dt (33)
By using this equation (33) and the equation
Etu [c, l, k, t] = u [c, l, k, t] (34)
one obtains an equation equivalent to (32), which is written :
0 ≡ Max {u [c, l, k, t] dt
+[Vt + µkVk + µwVw +
1
2
σ2kVkk +
1
2
σ2wVww + σkσwVkw]dt} (35)
Parameters associed with Itô’s process are as follows :
µk = (µh + µω + (µθ + σhθ + σθω) e− µδ − σhδ − σδω + σhω)
µw = rw − c+ (1− e− l) k + w (µ− r1)
0X
σ2k = σ
2
h + σ
2
ω + σ
2
θe
2 + σ2δ + 2σhθe+ 2σθωe− 2σθδe+ 2σhω − 2σhδ − 2σδω
since σk = (σh + σω + σθe− σδ)0
σ2w = w
2X 0ΣX since σw = wX 0Γ0
σkσw = kwΣ0ωX
By dividing the two members of (35) by dt and replacing µk, µw, σ
2
k, σ
2
w, and
σkσw by their above expression, one obtains the final version of the initial maxi-
mization program (12), which corresponds to equation (18) in the text:
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0 ≡ Max {u [c, l, k, t] + Vkk (µh + µω + (µθ + σhθ + σθω) e− µδ − σδh − σδω + σhω)
+Vw
£
rw + (1− e− l) k − c+ w (µ− r1)0X
¤
+
1
2
Vkkk
2
¡
σ2h + σ
2
ω + σ
2
θe
2 + σ2δ + 2σhθe+ 2σθωe− 2σθδe+ 2σhω − 2σhδ − 2σδω
¢
+
1
2
Vwww
2X 0ΣX + VkwkwΣ0ωX + Vt}
A.3 Explicit solutions
Knowing the form of the utility function, we recompute the optimality conditions
from this function and we replace them in equation (18). We then obtain a new
form of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, from which one defines the explicit
solutions of the stochastic optimization problem :
0 = u (1− γ − λ)− Vwc+ Vkk (µh + µω − µδ − σhδ − σδω + σhω) + Vw (k + rw)
+
1
2
Vkkk
2
¡
σ2h + σ
2
ω + σ
2
δ + 2σhω − 2σhδ − 2σδω
¢
+
Vkkk (σθδ − σhθ − σθω) + Vw − Vk (µθ + σhθ + σθω)
Vkkσ2θ
×
{Vk (µθ + σhθ + σθω)− Vw − Vkk (σθδ − σhθ − σθω)
+
1
2
[Vkkk (σθδ − σhθ − σθω) + Vw − Vk (µθ + σhθ + σθω)]} (36)
−Vw (µ− r1) + VkwkΣ
0
ω
VwwΣ
×µ
Vw (µ− r1)− VkwkΣ0ω +
1
2
(Vw (µ− r1) + VkwkΣ0ω)
¶
+ Vt
By observing that ”Vk (µθ + σhθ + σθω)” and ”Vw” disappear inside the second
bracket, equation (36) can be simplified in the following way:
0 = u (1− γ − λ)− Vwc+ Vt + Vkk (µh + µω − µδ − σhδ − σδω + σhω) + Vw (k + rw)
+
1
2
Vkkk
2
¡
σ2h + σ
2
ω + σ
2
δ + 2σhω − 2σhδ − 2σδω
¢
−1
2
[Vk (µθ + σhθ + σθω)− Vw − Vkkk (σθδ − σθω)]
2
Vkkσ2θ
(37)
−Vw (µ− r1) + VkwkΣ
0
ω
VwwΣ
µ
Vw (µ− r1)− VkwkΣ0ω +
1
2
(Vw (µ− r1) + VkwkΣ0ω)
¶
The development of the last bracket gives :
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0 = u (1− γ − λ)− Vwc+ Vt + Vkk (µh + µω − µδ − σhδ − σδω + σhω) + Vw (k + rw)
+
1
2
Vkkk
2
¡
σ2h + σ
2
ω + σ
2
δ + 2σhω − 2σhδ − 2σδω
¢
−1
2
[Vk (µθ + σhθ + σθω)− Vw − Vkkk (σθδ − σhθ − σθω)]
2
Vkkσ2θ
(38)
+VkwkΣ0ω
µ
−Vw (µ− r1)− VkwkΣ0ω
VwwΣ
¶
+
1
2
VwwΣ
µ
−Vw (µ− r1)− VkwkΣ0ω
VwwΣ
¶2
Factorizing terms into brackets and simplifying, one obtains:
0 = u (1− γ − λ)− Vwc+ Vkk (µh + µω − µδ − σhδ − σδω + σhω) + Vw (k + rw)
+
1
2
Vkkk
2
¡
σ2h + σ
2
ω + σ
2
δ + 2σhω − 2σhδ − 2σδω
¢
−1
2
[Vk (µθ + σhθ + σθω)− Vw − Vkkk (σθδ − σhθ − σθω)]
2
Vkkσ2θ
(39)
+
−Vw (µ− r1)− VkwkΣ0ω
VwwΣ
µ
VkwkΣ0ω −
1
2
Vw (µ− r1)−
1
2
VkwkΣ0ω
¶
+ Vt
By simplifying inside the last bracket and arranging the terms, we find the final
expression of the Bellman equation:
0 = u (1− γ − λ)− Vwc−
1
2
[Vk (µθ + σhθ + σθω)− Vw − Vkkk (σθδ − σhθ − σθω)]
2
Vkkσ2θ
−1
2
n
[Vw (µ− r1) + VkwkΣ0ω]
0Σ−1 [Vw (µ− r1) + VkwkΣ0ω]
o
/Vww
+Vkk (µh + µω − µδ − σhδ − σδω + σhω) + Vw (k + rw)
+
1
2
Vkkk
2
¡
σ2h + σ
2
ω + σ
2
δ + 2σhω − 2σhδ − 2σδω
¢
+ Vt (40)
Given the specification of the utility function, the equation above admits an
approximate solution:
V [k (t) , w (t) , t] ' β (t) [η (t) k (t) + w (t)−w (t)]γ+λ (41)
It is then enough to use the following expressions to obtain the explicit solutions
of the starting problem (12):
Vk ' β (t) (γ + λ) η (t) [η (t) k (t) + w (t)−w (t)]γ+λ−1 (42)
Vw ' β (t) (γ + λ) [η (t) k (t) + w (t)−w (t)]γ+λ−1 (43)
Vkk ' β (t) (γ + λ) (γ + λ− 1) η2 (t) [η (t) k (t) + w (t)−w (t)]γ+λ−2 (44)
Vww ' β (t) (γ + λ) (γ + λ− 1) [η (t) k (t) + w (t)−w (t)]γ+λ−2 (45)
Vkw ' β (t) (γ + λ) (γ + λ− 1) η (t) [η (t) k (t) + w (t)−w (t)]γ+λ−2 (46)
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More precisely, from these conditions, one obtains the following solutions19 :
uc ' αγ (c− c)γ−1 (lk)λ (47)
ul ' αλ (c− c)γ (lk)λ−1 k (48)
The ratio (47)/(48) gives
uc
ul
' γ
λ
lk
c− c
1
k
(49)
However
uc
ul
' 1
k
d’où lk ' λ
γ
(c− c) (50)
By substituing (50) in (47) one finds :
uc ' αγ (c− c)γ−1
µ
λ
γ
(c− c)
¶λ
(51)
thus by simplifying :
uc ' αλλγ1−γ (c− c)γ+λ−1 (52)
Notice that uc ' Vw thus
αλλγ1−γ (c− c)γ+λ−1 ' β (γ + λ) [ηk + w −w]γ+λ−1 (53)
Put otherwise
(c− c)γ+λ−1 ' β
α
(γ + λ)
λλγ1−γ
[ηk + w −w]γ+λ−1 (54)
By rearranging (54), one obtains the optimal level of consumption corresponding
to the expresson (26) in the text:
c∗ ' c+
"
α
β
λλγ1−γ
γ + λ
# 1
1−γ−λ
[ηk + w −w]
To determine the optimal quantity of leisure, we just replace the optimal value
of the consumption defined above in (50). One obtains:
l ' λ
γ
1
k
"
α
β
λλγ1−γ
γ + λ
# 1
1−γ−λ
[ηk + w −w] (55)
By putting η in factor and inserting λγ into the bracket, one finds (27):
l∗ ' η
·
α
β
γγλ1−γ
γ + λ
¸ 1
1−γ−λ ·
1 +
w −w
ηk
¸
(56)
19To reduce the writing, we remove the time subscripts ”(t)”.
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To determine the explicit optimal value of investment in financial assets, it is
necessary to replace (43), (45) and (46) in
wX '
µ
− Vw
Vwww
¶
Σ−1 (µ− r1)−
µ
Vkwk
Vww
¶
Σ−1Σω (57)
That give
wX '
Ã
− β (γ + λ) [ηk + w −w]
γ+λ−1
β (γ + λ) (γ + λ− 1) [ηk + w −w]γ+λ−2w
!
Σ−1 (µ− r1)
−
Ã
β (γ + λ) (γ + λ− 1) η [ηk + w −w]γ+λ−2 k
β (γ + λ) (γ + λ− 1) [ηk + w −w]γ+λ−2
!
Σ−1Σω (58)
By simplifying, one directly obtains
wX ' Σ
−1 (µ− r1)
1− γ − λ [ηk + w −w] + ηkΣ
−1Σω (59)
Assuming that Σ0ω ' 0, we finally obtain expression (28):
wX∗ ' Σ
−1 (µ− r1)
1− γ − λ [ηk + w −w] (60)
Finally, the optimal level of human capital investment is given by equation (22)
in text :
e '
µ
− Vk
Vkkk
¶
(µθ + σhθ + σθω)− Vw/Vk
σ2θ
+
σθδ − σhθ − σθω
σ2θ
(61)
By substituting (42), (43) and (44) into (61) one obtains
e '
Ã
− β (γ + λ) η [ηk + w −w]
γ+λ−1
β (γ + λ) (γ + λ− 1) η2 [ηk + w −w]γ+λ−2 k
!
×
(µθ + σhθ + σθω)−
β(γ+λ)[ηk+w−w]γ+λ−1
β(γ+λ)η[ηk+w−w]γ+λ−1
σ2θ
+
σθδ − σhθ − σθω
σ2θ
(62)
That is, by simplifying
e '
µ
− ηk + w −w
(γ + λ− 1) ηk
¶
(µθ + σhθ + σθω)− 1/η
σ2θ
+
σθδ − σhθ − σθω
σ2θ
(63)
Put otherwise, we find the explicit solution (29) :
e∗ (t) ' (µθ + σhθ + σθω)− 1/η
(1− γ − λ)σ2θ
·
1 +
w −w
ηk
¸
+
σθδ − σhθ − σθω
σ2θ
(64)
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A.4 The marginal eﬀect of eﬀective human capital and eﬀec-
tive financial wealth on the pattern of optimal variables
over the life cycle
The eﬀect of eﬀective financial wealth on consumption is positive :
∂c
∂(w −w) =
"
α
β
λλγ1−γ
γ + λ
# 1
1−γ−λ
> 0
Over the life cycle, this eﬀect is still positive if
.
α is low. Otherwise, the marginal
propensity to consume decrease over the life cycle.
d
dt
·
∂c
∂(w −w)
¸
=
1
β
1
1− γ − λ
λλγ1−γ
γ + λ
"
α
β
λλγ1−γ
γ + λ
# γ+λ
1−γ−λ
Ã
.
α− α
.
β
β
!
The marginal eﬀect of financial wealth (expressed in proportion of eﬀective hu-
man capital ) on leisure, is the same :
∂l
∂ (w−w)ηk
=
·
α
β
γγλ1−γ
γ + λ
¸ 1
1−γ−λ
> 0
The instantaneous eﬀect of an increase in the ratio of eﬀective human capital
over eﬀective financial capital on human capital investment is positive:
∂e
∂ (w−w)ηk
=
(µθ + σhθ + σθω)− 1/η
(1− γ − λ)σ2θ
> 0
The derivative of this eﬀect with respect to time depends on the current marginal
rate of substitution between human and financial capital. If it drops during time¡ .
η < 0
¢
, as one may expect, the investment in human capital (e) decreases over the
life cycle:
d
dt
"
∂e
∂ (w−w)ηk
#
=
.
η
η2
1
(1− γ − λ)σ2θ
< 0
Changes in eﬀective financial and human capital have no eﬀect on the variations
over time of investment in risky assets. Only current investment in risky assets is
positively aﬀected by an increase in (w −w) or ηk :
d
dt
·
∂wX
∂(w −w)
¸
= 0
d
dt
·
∂wX
∂ηk
¸
= 0
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